

Ex-CIA chief favors nuclear arms freeze

From Wire Services

Washington—Former CIA Director William E. Colby yesterday endorsed the idea of a Soviet-American nuclear weapons freeze, saying either a freeze or an arms limitation agreement "is adequately verifiable for the safety of the country, and the chance of violation is minimal."

"The chance of injury to the country is minimal, and the advantage to our country and the advantage to the Soviets of reducing the numbers of and the ingenuity of these new devices which are progressively more dangerous is well worth that minimal chance of violation of a minimal degree," he said.

In fact, he said, any nuclear arms accord with Moscow would make it "easier rather than harder" to keep tabs on what the Soviets are doing by empowering the United States to demand an explanation of any suspicious Soviet arms behavior.

Mr. Colby, who headed the CIA from 1973 to 1976, made his remarks at a press breakfast organized by the nuclear freeze movement.

He said normal CIA intelligence checks on Soviet compliance—through satellite photography, electronic eavesdropping and analysis of observable Soviet activities and publications—would come into play. In addition, he said, the Soviets would

have to consider whether some Soviet official knowledgeable about the cheating would reveal it.

He said the Soviets could surreptitiously violate an agreement to freeze the production, deployment or testing of new nuclear weapons for a while, but not for long enough to endanger America's security to any significant degree.

"It is conceivable they can go into one of those salt mines and produce something and hammer it out all very quietly and secretly, and nobody will be able to see it or know about it," he said. "But the question has to be asked, can they do that in a way that has any strategic significance? And there I think the answer is basically no."

His position on verification differs from the Reagan administration's. In April, a State Department policy statement said:

"A freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified. The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets."

Mr. Colby said that although no sane American or Russian leader would use nuclear weapons in a first strike, "we have the problem of insane men getting ahold of them—that's why we have to reduce them."

He endorsed President Reagan's proposal for deep mutual cuts in nuclear warheads through a strategic arms reduction treaty.

The assumption that war can be forever deterred by the fear of mutual annihilation "is becoming more and more tenuous as a logical basis for living," Mr. Colby said.

He also called for a treaty that would establish a joint "war room" staffed by American and Russian officers as a means of preventing an accidental nuclear war.

"We have got to improve our crisis communications," he said, adding that with the two superpowers deploying increasingly accurate missiles, a nuclear crisis "can take place in a matter of hours and even shorter."

Former CIA chief supports arms freeze

By Mike Feinsilber
 Associated Press

WASHINGTON — Former CIA Director William Colby yesterday endorsed the idea of a weapons freeze between the United States and the Soviet Union, saying it would pose no significant danger of undetected Soviet cheating.

In fact, he said, any nuclear arms accord with Moscow would make it "easier rather than harder" to keep tabs on what the Soviets are doing by empowering the United States to demand to know the nature of any suspicious Soviet arms behavior.

And if the Soviets cheated, they always would have to worry that so many officials would know of it that any one of them, repelled by the threat to world peace, might tell the West, Colby said.

The former intelligence officer, who served during the Nixon and Ford administrations, discussed the prospects of a verification freeze during a breakfast meeting here with reporters.

He said the Soviets could surreptitiously violate an agreement to freeze the production, deployment or testing of new nuclear weapons for a while, but not long enough to endanger U.S. security significantly.

"It is conceivable they can go into one of those salt mines and produce something and hammer it out all very quietly and secretly and nobody will be able to see it or know about it," he said.

"But the question has to be asked, can they do that in a way that has any strategic significance? And there I think the answer is basically no. In other words, successful violations will almost surely be marginal in their real effect."

His position on verification differs from that of the Reagan administration. In April, a State Department policy statement said:

"A freeze on all testing, production and deployment of nuclear weapons would include important elements that cannot be verified. The practical result is that the United States would live up to a freeze in all its aspects, while there would be considerable doubt that the Soviets would also live up to it. We simply cannot afford to base our national security on trust of the Soviets."


President Reagan opposes a freeze, but the idea has support in Congress and was endorsed by the Democrats last week at their party conference in Philadelphia. Both the House and Senate are expected to vote this summer on resolutions asking Reagan to propose a freeze to the Soviets as a first step toward disarmament.

Opponents have raised the question of verifying Soviet compliance as one objection to a freeze. But Colby argued that a freeze treaty would allow the United States to demand to look into any suspicious activities detected by intelligence means. Without a treaty, he said, the Soviets can simply say, "That's none of your business."

Colby said normal CIA intelligence checks on Soviet compliance would come into play. But in addition, he said, the Soviets would have to consider whether someone knowledgeable about the cheating would reveal it.

Colby said U.S. security cannot depend on such an off-chance episode. But when that possibility is placed alongside other intelligence-gathering means, he said, it is safe to conclude that U.S. security would not be endangered by a freeze agreement or any other disarmament accord.

He said that either a freeze or an arms limitation agreement "is adequately verifiable for the safety of the country and the chance of violation is minimal."




William Colby
 Says agreements can be verified

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 36

NEWSWEEK
14 JUNE 1982

The Legacy of Watergate



I would say that, as far as the country is concerned, after the understandable reaction immediately after Watergate with regard to politics generally, the castration of the CIA, the opposition to some of the attitudes toward the FBI, et cetera . . . the Watergate syndrome has probably run its course, and that is to the good.

—Richard M. Nixon on the CBS "Morning News"


Here he was again, familiarly ill at ease, on early-morning TV, once more playing down the scandal that forced him to resign the highest office in the land. But Watergate was much more than a personal tragedy for a dishonored President: it was a rite of passage for the nation. And the "Watergate syndrome," which began with the disclosure of abuses in Richard Nixon's 1972 campaign organization, affected American institutions from the press to the Presidency itself. Ten years after the June 17 break-in at Democratic National Committee headquarters in Washington's Watergate complex, the legacy is still strong. It has curbed the FBI and the CIA, awakened a dormant Congress, visited the "post-Watergate morality" upon big business, and drastically altered the ethical standards imposed on public officials at every level of government.

But now the pendulum is swinging back a bit, many politicians and historians agree, partly because some reactions to Watergate have proven unwieldy, others counterproductive. "Whenever you have a national trauma of that magnitude, the reforms that rear in behind it inevitably go too far," says San Francisco businessman William Ruckelshaus, who resigned as deputy Attorney General rather than fire Watergate special prosecutor Archibald Cox at Nixon's behest in 1973. And while many find the higher level of public skepticism about politics and government engendered by Watergate to be healthy, others see a dangerous cynicism that clogs the democratic process, making it difficult for political leadership to get others to follow. "I think the general public thinks all of us are crooks, and I really reject that idea," says Georgia State Sen. Julian Bond.

Along with the reforms, the Watergate legacy includes some fascinating sidelights, including a legion of dramatis personae (page 42) who are older and presiding over a new era, and some who are like John Ehrlichman, H. R. (Bob) Haldeman and Nixon himself (page 38)—are considerably richer. Watergate also produced a lexicon of its own once strange terms—some now familiar, some strange

again—from bugs, bl. Attorney General Jol the not-quite-candid Finally, there are the able—questions: how Watergate and the oil was The Washington only as Deep Throat?

Speaking for themselves through the sampling of a new NEWSWEEK Poll, a vast majority of Americans (75 percent) believe that Nixon's actions regarding Watergate were serious enough to warrant his resignation—more than thought so at the time he stepped down. But the numbers opposing a pardon granted him by Gerald Ford—and opposing a return to public life by Nixon—have eroded with the years. Most of those polled also continue to see Watergate as an extraordinarily serious matter because of the corruption it revealed, but the passage of time and disclosure of improprieties in other administrations have apparently increased the number who believe it was politics as usual. Far more thought changes prompted by the scandal were beneficial than thought them harmful—but a plurality of about 40 percent said they saw no significant changes at all. And fully 53 percent said they thought the abuse of Presidential power revealed as a result of Watergate could easily happen again.*



Ken Regan—Camera 5

'I have nothing to add . . . I'm looking to the future rather than the past'

disclosures showed that Nixon was extreme but not alone in his Presidential improprieties. "Watergate was a reflection of how bad off we had become," says historian Gary Wills of Northwestern University. "We had turned to spying on ourselves; Presidents were setting up teams to topple foreign governments." Former White House counsel John Dean agrees, finding "a surprising degree of continuity between one Presidency and the next on what is acceptable conduct. Watergate snapped that continuity; it could have

But the snap caused some problems of its own. Historian/

*For this Newsweek Poll, the Gallup Organization interviewed 519 adults by telephone on June 2 and June 3. The margin of error is plus or minus 5 percentage points.

STATINTL

ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE 4

TV GUIDE
12 June 1982

WHY AMERICAN IS SO VULNERABLE TO FOREIGN PROPAGANDA

Hungry for big scoops—and
bigger ratings—the networks are natural
targets for planted
stories and false rumors

By John Weisman

"I believe," says CBS anchorman Dan Rather, "that you have to go at every story with skepticism. But certainly, when you're working on a story that brushes on intelligence, you ought to turn your skeptical meter up very high."

Does television news turn its skeptical meter up high enough when it covers intelligence stories? Do correspondents and anchors take enough time in the reporting of intelligence-sourced pieces to explain that they are not black and white but "gray" stories that could contain misinformation and untruth? Finally, are American networks and viewers prime targets of Soviet disinformation, the covert program to destabilize public opinion in the West, which is controlled by the KGB?

The last of these questions may be the easiest to answer. According to Arkady Shevchenko, the highest-ranking Soviet diplomat ever to defect to the United States, American viewers and networks are prime targets of the KGB's disinformation program. "To get on American television—that is one of the highest priorities on the KGB agenda," Shevchenko claims.

What exactly is disinformation? According to a former CIA station chief and Soviet expert, calls it "calculated untruth."

quite masterful. They plant a story—totally fictitious—in a leftist paper in, say, Bombay. Then it gets picked up by a Communist journal in Rio. Then in Rome. Then Tass, the Soviet news agency, lifts it from the Rome paper and runs it as a "sources say" news item. And soon the non-Communist press starts to pick up on it, using terms such as, "It is alleged that. . . ." And thus an absolute lie gets into general circulation."

What sorts of lies have received such coverage? One Foreign Service officer with extensive experience behind the Iron Curtain recalls, "In Belgrade, the rumor that the assassination of [former Italian Premier] Aldo Moro was a CIA job was floated by Soviet intelligence sources and treated by the Yugoslavian press as a hard story."

Another KGB fabrication was floated in Pakistan, where the rumor that the U.S. was responsible for the takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca was one reason for an angry mob of Moslems storming and burning the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad in November 1979.

Closer to home, Sen. Harrison Schmitt (R-N. Mex.), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, thinks the Soviets were responsible for starting a rumor that the

ly," says Schmitt, "they looked at our system closely and realized that there's not much the Government can do to prevent disinformation being aired in a free society."

ABC senior correspondent John Scall, whose own background includes diplomacy as well as journalism (he was a U.N. Ambassador during the Nixon Administration), says: "I think too little has been said in the past about the importance of disinformation and how it is a major intelligence weapon. The Soviets are masters at spreading rumors—I wish we were as good."

Senator Schmitt complains: "Anything that is the least bit credible, which is contrary to Government policy, or to what the Government has been doing, is fertile ground for news media geared toward finding controversy." Reporters have, for example, long used renegade former CIA agent Philip Agee as an unnamed source for stories that embarrass the U.S. Government. It would help, say many U.S. Government officials, if such reports also carried the information that Agee is being supported financially by Cuba's Castro regime.

blatant disinformation ploys, which have in the past included bogus

ENDED